The paper studies some variants of Statecharts step semantics in the framework of structural operational semantics. The chosen framework allows to study precongruence and congruence properties of behavioral preorders and equivalences and to compare, with respect to these properties, the di erent step semantics considered.
Introduction
Statecharts is a visual formalism for speciÿcation of reactive systems introduced originally in [10] . The formalism generalizes state-transition diagrams. The diagrams of Statecharts, called statecharts, are characterized by hierarchical structure of states, explicit representation of parallelism, and communication among parallel components in the form of broadcast. Statecharts belongs to the class of synchronous formalisms, which adopt the abstraction that a reactive system reacts instantaneously and in null time to stimuli of the environment (synchronous hypothesis [3] ). Such reactions are called steps.
Among the semantics proposed one must distinguish between semantics which assume that signals broadcast by a statechart component in a step are sensed and reacted to by other components at the next step (see [11] ), and semantics which assume that signals broadcast by a component may have e ect instantaneously in the same step when emission takes place.
This latter class of semantics have to deal with the situation where a signal may be absent and present at a same instant of time. This may happen, for instance, when a transition t 1 in a component requires the absence of a signal a to be triggered, and performing t 1 broadcasts signals which instantaneously trigger a transition t 2 , in another component, which broadcasts a. The microstep semantics justiÿes this kind of inconsistency by associating a causal ordering to transitions performed in the same step. This point of view, originally proposed in [12] , has been successively adopted in [13, 14, 15, 19] . An opposite way of dealing with the inconsistency problem is that introduced in [22] which requires global consistency of steps, namely discards steps where inconsistencies appear (step semantics). This approach may lead to situations where for a conÿguration of the statechart the step is undeÿned.
Step semantics appears nowadays to be the style of Statecharts semantics most widely accepted [25, 26, 11, 18, 20, 16] . Variants of step semantics have been proposed (see [22, 18, 20] ). In [22] the concept of step semantics is originally introduced, a declarative deÿnition of a statechart step has been given together with an algorithm to compute it. Papers [25, 26] propose a compositional deÿnition for such step, based on labeled transition systems (LTSs) constructed inductively. The idea is resumed in [18] where a variant of the step of [22] is considered with the motivation of avoiding the case where the step is undeÿned.
The many semantics proposed for Statecharts since its introduction (see [2] for a survey), have mostly found justiÿcation in facility of use of the language for speciÿ-cation purposes. However, a formal comparison of the merits of the di erent proposals with respect to signiÿcant criteria is lacking. We aim at making a step towards this direction.
In the present paper we are interested in developing a framework for comparing two interpretations of the semantics of [22] (one interpretation is that of [20] ) and the semantics of [18] . A signiÿcant criterion for comparing semantics is to consider the classes of behavioral preorders and equivalences which are preserved by the operations used to construct statecharts inductively, i.e. precongruences and congruences. In fact, one does not want to distinguish between statecharts which are behaviorally equivalent from a certain point of view. Moreover, one may want to replace, in a speciÿcation, a component with an equivalent one, provided that the overall behavior is preserved.
The framework we have chosen for this comparison is structural operational semantics [21] (SOS), which we use to deÿne step semantics in terms of LTSs. The advantages of this choice is that it is a widely accepted framework for deÿning operational semantics and o ers particular facilities for studying behavioral preorder and equivalence notions. In particular, the set of established results in the theory of SOS allows one to derive precongruence and congruence results about the deÿned LTSs directly from the syntactic constraints of the format of the SOS transition rules used to deÿne the LTS itself.
In the SOS framework we give the semantics of [18] , for which the notion of step is always deÿned, and two interpretations of the semantics of [22] , for which the notion of step may be undeÿned. The two interpretations di er only in the representation of the undeÿnability of steps: in one case there is no representation, in the other there is an explicit representation (this explicit representation is considered also in [20] ).
The notions of preorder we consider in this paper are ready simulation, simulation, ready trace preorder, failure preorder and trace preorder. As notions of equivalence we consider the kernels of these preorders. We will show that all of these preorders are precongruences for the SOS semantics of [18, 22] , this in the version without representation of undeÿnability of steps. However, for this latter semantics, the failure equivalence and the trace equivalence do not allow to distinguish a signiÿcant property of systems, namely the ability of reacting to the environment prompts (deÿnability and undeÿnability of steps for a given environment). This justiÿes the study of the second SOS interpretation of the semantics of [22] , where the inability of reacting is explicitly encoded in the LTS. We show that, unfortunately, in this version only ready simulation and ready trace preorder are precongruences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we overview the language Statecharts and in Section 3 we deÿne statecharts as terms of a process algebra. In Section 4 we deÿne the three SOS interpretations of the step semantics we consider in this paper, and in Section 5 we show the correspondence between the SOS semantics deÿned and the step semantics of [22, 18, 20] . In Section 6 we recall preorder and equivalence notions and we prove precongruence and congruence results. Finally, in Section 7 we give SOS interpretations for some additional features of Statecharts, namely histories and priorities.
Statecharts: an overview
Statecharts is a language that extends the notation of ÿnite state machines (FSMs) with concepts of hierarchy, concurrency and broadcast communication. Hierarchy is achieved by allowing FSM states to be reÿned by injecting other FSMs. A FSM reÿning a state starts running when that state is activated and is preempted when that state is deactivated. Concurrency is achieved by allowing FSMs to run in parallel. FSMs running in parallel communicate by broadcasting and sensing binary signals.
FSM transitions are labeled by pairs, where the ÿrst component is referred to as trigger and consists of a set of positive and negated signals (an event), and the second component is referred to as action and consists of a set of positive signals. If the source state of a transition is active and the environment o ers the signals in the trigger, but not the negated ones, then the transition is triggered; it ÿres and broadcasts over the environment the signals occurring in the action. In this case the source state is deactivated and the target state is activated.
FSM states are either basic states, or or-states, or and-states. Basic states cannot have substates, i.e. they cannot be reÿned. Immediate substates of an or-state are orthogonal, in the sense that when the or-state is active then exactly one of them is active. They may be connected by transitions as in the case of a classical FSM. An or-state has a privileged immediate substate called default state, which is activated when the or-state is. When an and-state is active then all its immediate substates are active, thus representing activities running in parallel. A Statecharts program is usually called a statechart. Its states are organized as a tree-like structure, where the root of the tree is called the root state of the statechart, the children of a state are its immediate substates, and the leaves of the tree are the basic states.
The graphical convention is that states are depicted as boxes and the box of the substate of another state is drawn inside the area of the box of that state; and-states are depicted as boxes whose area is partitioned by dashed lines and each element of the partition is a parallel component of the state. A default state is marked by a dangling arrow. The statechart of Fig. 1 consists of an and-state, state 9, having two or-states, 5 and 8, as immediate substates. They represent FSMs running in parallel. The former FSM consists of states 3 and 4 and of transition t 3 , while the latter FSM consists of states 6 and 7 and of transition t 2 . States 3 and 6 are the default states of 5 and 8, respectively. State 3 is an or-state and is reÿned by a FSM consisting of states 1 and 2 and of transition t 1 . State 9 is the root-state. States 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 are the basic states.
We assume a countable set of signals S, and, following Statecharts convention, we use a; b; : : : to range over S, we denote with a the negation of a, and with S the set { a | a ∈ S}. With abuse of notation, we deÿne a = a.
Here we describe informally the step semantics for Statecharts as deÿned in [18] . A statechart maintains an ongoing interaction with its environment and evolves from conÿguration to conÿguration, starting from the initial conÿguration. A conÿguration C is a maximal set of states fulÿlling the requirement that if an and-state is in C then all its immediate substates are in C, and if an or-state is in C then exactly one of its immediate substates is in C. The initial conÿguration C 0 is such that, for any or-state in C 0 , its default state is in C 0 .
Statecharts assumes a discrete time domain (for instance natural numbers), i.e. time is viewed as a sequence of instants. At each instant the external environment prompts the statechart by broadcasting a set of signals in S, which cause an instantaneous reaction of the statechart: this performs instantaneously a set of transitions, called a step, and broadcasts to the environment the signals occurring in the action of the transitions. Note that signals broadcast by the statechart are available at the same instant as well as signals broadcast by the environment are. This means that Statecharts adopt the principle of synchronous hypothesis [3] , which, as is well known, is an abstraction: it amounts to requiring that the statechart is faster than the environment, in the sense that the statechart is able to complete a reaction to an input before the environment gives the subsequent input.
A step is a maximal set of transitions relevant in C that are pairwise consistent and compatible and that satisfy the property of causality. A transition is relevant in a conÿguration C if its source state is in C. Two transitions are consistent if they belong to components running in parallel, and are compatible if in the action of one of the transitions there is no signal appearing negated in the trigger of the other (in the opposite case the execution of the former would prevent the execution of the latter). When ÿred, a transition broadcasts instantaneously to the environment the signals occurring in its action, which can (instantaneously) trigger new transitions. A step must satisfy the property of causality, i.e. it can be viewed as a sequence of transitions t 1 ; : : : ; t n such that t i is triggered by the signals broadcast by both the environment and the transitions t 1 ; : : : ; t i−1 .
If more than one step is possible, one of them is non-deterministically chosen. When a step is performed from a conÿguration C, a new conÿguration C is entered, which is obtained from C by removing all states that are (substates of) source states of transitions in the step, and by adding all states that are target states of transitions in the step. Moreover, if an and-state is entered then all its substates are entered, and if an or-state is entered then its default state is entered.
Statechart terms
In this section, following the approach of [25] (see also [26] ) we deÿne statecharts as terms (processes) of a process algebra. According to the philosophy of process algebras, a statechart term carries information both on the syntactic structure and on the internal conÿguration of the statechart, namely a statechart term represents a statechart where the set of currently active states are marked. Deÿnition 1. Let N be an alphabet of states. The terms of the statechart process algebra are generated by the following grammar:
(p n1 ; : : : ; p n k );p ni ; T ]; where n; n 1 ; n 2 ; : : : ; n k range over N; p n ; p n1 ; p n2 ; : : : ; p n k ;p ni range over terms, n i ∈ {n 1 ; : : : ; n k } and T ⊆ {n 1 ; : : : ; n k } × 2 S∪ S × 2 S × {n 1 ; : : : ; n k }.
The term [n] represents the statechart consisting of only one (basic) state n (the conÿguration is {n}).
The term [n :p n1 ; p n2 ] represents a statechart having the and-state n as root-state and consisting of two parallel components p n1 and p n2 . Since all of the components of an active and-state are active, the term represents the conÿguration including n and all of the states in the conÿgurations of both p n1 and p n2 .
The term p n = [n : (p n1 ; : : : ; p n k );p ni ; T ] represents a statechart having the or-state n as root-state and consisting of k orthogonal components p n1 ; : : : ; p n k , with p n1 the default component. Each tuple n i ; A; B; n j ∈ T describes a transition from the state n i to the state n j , triggered by the event A and communicating signals in B. The terms p n1 ; : : : ; p n k represent the initial conÿgurations of the orthogonal components. The termp ni represents the component currently active. We will require thatp ni represents a conÿguration of the statechart rooted in n i and reachable from p ni . The term p n represents the conÿguration including n and all of the states in the conÿguration of the active componentp ni .
As an example, the initial conÿguration of the statechart z 1 of Fig. 2 We give now some auxiliary deÿnitions. For a term p n , let states(p n ) and trans(p n ) denote the set of state names occurring in p n and the set of tuples describing transitions in p n , respectively. Moreover, let active(p n ) ⊆ states(p n ) denote the set of active states of p n (i.e. the statechart conÿguration represented by p n ), recursively deÿned as follows: : : : ; states(p n k ) are pairwise disjoint) and do not contain n. For n ; n ∈ states(p n ), we write n ≺ pn n if n is a substate of n , i.e. if there are a subterm p n of p n and a subterm p n of p n . In the following, we assume that for any term p n = [n : (p n1 ; : : : ; p n k );p ni ; T ]; states(p ni ) = states(p ni ); trans(p ni ) = trans(p ni ) and n ≺p n i n i n ≺ pn i n . This syntactic restriction ensures thatp ni and p ni represent conÿgurations of the same statechart. Given a term p n and a transition t = n i ; A; B; n j belonging to trans(p n ), we denote by tr(t) and act(t) the trigger A and the action B of t, respectively, and we assume that act(t) ∩ tr(t) = ∅. Moreover, we denote with out(t) and in(t) the source state n i and the target state n j of t, respectively.
We recall now the step semantics of Statecharts as given in [18, 22, 20] . According to [18] , a step from a conÿguration represented by a term p n for a given set of signals S is a maximal set of transitions T that are relevant in p n , triggered by the union of S with the signals broadcast by these transitions, pairwise consistent and compatible, and causally justiÿed by S.
The set of transitions relevant in p n are the transitions from states active in p n , i.e. the set
The set of transitions of p n triggered by a set of signals S is the set Tr(p n ; S ) = {t ∈ trans(p n ) | tr(t) ∩ S ⊆ S and tr(t) ∩ S ∩ S = ∅}:
Two transitions t 1 and t 2 of p n are consistent if they can be performed in parallel, i.e. if there is a subterm [n : p n1 ;p n2 ] of p n with t 1 ∈trans(p n1 ) and t 2 ∈trans(p n2 ). The set of transitions consistent with T ⊆ trans(p n ) is Cons(p n ; T ) = {t ∈ trans(p n ) | ∀t ∈ T : t and t are consistent}:
Two transitions are compatible if the action of one does not contradict the trigger of the other. Hence, the set of transitions compatible with T ⊆ trans(p n ) is
Now, the set En(p n ; S; T ) of transitions enabled in a term p n by a set of signals S and by another set of transitions T is deÿned as follows:
We are ÿnally able to deÿne the notion of step for a term p n . The set of possible steps for a set of signals S ⊆ S is the set Steps(p n ; S) deÿned as follows:
{T ⊆ trans(p n ) | T is inseparable for S and En(p n ; S; T ) = T };
where T is inseparable for S if T is causally justiÿed by S i.e. if for any subset T ⊂ T; En(p n ; S; T ) ∩ (T \T ) = ∅:
To explain the notion of inseparability, let us consider the statechart z 1 in Fig. 2 with the transitions t 1 and t 2 relabeled by a=b and b=a, respectively, and let us consider the term p 7 representing the initial conÿguration of z 1 . Let us assume that the set S of communicated signals is empty. Notice that the set T = {t 1 ; t 2 } is such that T = En(p 7 ; S; T ) since act(t 1 ) triggers t 2 and act(t 2 ) triggers t 1 , even if there is no causal justiÿcation for any triggering, since the environment triggers neither t 1 nor t 2 separately. Now, T is not inseparable for S since En(p 7 ; S; ∅) = ∅. On the contrary, the set T = ∅, which satisÿes T = En(p 7 ; S; T ), is inseparable for S. It follows that Steps(p 7 ; S) = {∅}. In general, as it has been argued in [22] , inseparability permits to reject steps consisting of transitions that are not justiÿed by the environment and that justify each other. Inseparability permits to enforce the property of causality.
Notice that for a step T ∈ Steps(p n ; S), the condition T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) guarantees signal consistency, namely that there exists no pair of transitions t; t ∈ T such that Fig. 3 . A non-reactive statechart (according to [22] ). tr(t) ∩ act(t ) = ∅. Vice versa, the condition En(p n ; S; T ) ⊆ T implies that there exists no transition t = ∈ T such that t is relevant, t is compatible and consistent with all transitions in T and t is triggered by S ∪ t∈T act(t). This means that signals broadcast by transitions in T are immediately sensed by other transitions, namely that the semantics enforces the synchronous hypothesis.
If Steps(p n ; S) is not a singleton, the choice among steps is non-deterministic. We introduce the notation p n T → p n to denote that p n reaches p n by a set of relevant and pairwise consistent transitions T , possibly giving a step: [18] di ers from the step semantics of Pnueli-Shalev (see [22] ) only in the deÿnition of the set En(p n ; S; T ) of Eq. (1). In the case of Pnueli-Shalev the deÿnition is En PS (p n ; S; T ) = Rel(p n ) ∩ Tr p n ; S ∪ t∈T act(t) ∩ Cons(p n ; T ); (2) namely the request of compatibility of the transitions in T is lacking. We denote by Steps PS (p n ; S) the set of steps obtained by exploiting the notion En PS (p n ; S; T ) instead of En(p n ; S; T ). The elements of Steps(p n ; S) and Steps PS (p n ; S) are inseparable ÿxpoints of the equations En(p n ; S; T ) = T and En PS (p n ; S; T ) = T , respectively. As explained in [18] , the main di erence between the two equations is that the former always admits ÿxpoints whereas the latter does not. The reason is that, for any set of transitions T , if T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) and t ∈ En(p n ; S; T ), then we are sure that T ∪ {t} ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ∪ {t}). On the contrary, if T ⊆ En PS (p n ; S; T ) and t ∈ En PS (p n ; S; T ), it may happen that T ∪ {t} * En PS (p n ; S; T ∪ {t}), since t may broadcast a signal appearing as negated in the trigger of some transition in T .
Assuming a notion from the ÿeld of synchronous languages, we say that a term p n is reactive if it can react to any input, namely if a step exists for any set of signals S. (According to the step semantics of [18] all terms are reactive.)
As an example, we see the di erence between the step semantics of [18] and [22] in the case of the statechart of Fig. 3 . Let p 5 denote the term representing its initial conÿguration. Let us assume that p 5 receives signal a and not signal b. While in the semantics of [22] only {t 1 } is a step, in the semantics of [18] both {t 1 } and {t 2 } are steps. Moreover, if p 5 receives neither signal a nor signal b, following the semantics of [18] {t 2 } is a step, because it is inseparable and En(p 5 ; ∅; {t 2 }) = {t 2 }. Note that t 1 = ∈ En(p 5 ; ∅; {t 2 }) since t 1 and t 2 are not compatible. On the contrary, according to the step semantics of [22] , p 5 cannot react, because there is no solution of the equation
The following proposition states the relationship between the two semantics.
Proposition 2. For any statechart term p n and set of signals S, it holds that Steps PS (p n ; S) ⊆ Steps(p n ; S).
The step semantics of [20] coincides with that of [22] when steps are deÿned. In the case where the semantics of [22] does not admit any step, the semantics of [20] represents the undeÿnability of steps by means of the step consisting of the empty set of transitions.
SOS interpretations for Statecharts
In this section we deÿne the step-semantics of Statecharts by using labeled transition systems. In the ÿrst subsection we give a SOS interpretation of the step semantics of [18] . In the second subsection we give two SOS interpretations of the step semantics of [22] . From the names of the proponents, we shall call the two semantics MPTsemantics and PS-semantics, respectively.
We begin with recalling that a LTS is a quadruple:
where S is a set of states, L is a set of labels, l → ⊆ S × S is a transition relation, for every l ∈ L, and P is a set of predicates such that P ⊆ S, for every P ∈ P.
Following the usual notation, we write s 1 . We write sP if s satisÿes P (i.e. s ∈ P) and s ¬ P otherwise. We denote by Initials(s) the set {l ∈ L | ∃s s l → s } ∪ {P ∈ P | sP}, and we call transitions both binary relations l → and unary predicates P. An LTS is usually deÿned by means of a transition system speciÿcation (TSS), which is a collection of transition rules allowing to rewrite the terms of an algebra describing processes. Given a signature (i.e. a set of function symbols with their arities), let T( ) denote the algebra of (open) terms freely constructed over a set of variables Var (ranged over by x; y; : : :) by applying function symbols in . The set T( ) is ranged over by t. Terms that do not contain variables are called closed terms.
The abstract syntax of process description languages is given by a signature and closed terms are called processes.
For a signature , a set of labels L and a set of predicates P, a transition rule has the form H= , where:
• H is a collection of positive premises of the form t l → t and tP, and of negative premises of the form t l 9 and t ¬P;
• is a conclusion of the form t l → t or tP, with t, t ranging over T( ), l ranging over L and P ranging over P. A TSS is a collection of transition rules of this form.
The left-hand side of the conclusion of a rule is called the source of , and, if the conclusion has the form t l → t , then t is called the target of . Transition rules containing only closed terms are called closed transition rules.
If a given TSS uses only positive premises in its transition rules, the construction of an LTS from the TSS is standard. If also negative premises are used, many ways of associating an LTS with a TSS have been proposed (see [8, 1] for an overview). Here we consider the method based on the technique of stratiÿcation, originally proposed in the setting of Logic Programming in [23] and adapted to TSSs in [9] . The notion of stratiÿed TSSs and the way LTSs are constructed from TSSs is recalled in Appendix A.
The MPT-semantics
In this section we give a SOS interpretation of the MPT-semantics in terms of an LTS without predicates. As usual, states of the LTS are statechart terms which, as previously noticed, correspond to statechart conÿgurations. Transitions of the LTS correspond to substeps (possibly proper subsets of steps), and labels carry information on the availability=unavailability of signals and on the causal justiÿcation of the considered (sub)step. The transitions of the LTS correspond to subsets of steps (instead of representing only steps) to permit a compositional construction of the LTS. In fact, a step of a statechart consisting of two components running in parallel is not, in general, the union of steps of the two components. As an example, let us consider the statecharts z 1 and z 2 in Fig. 2 . The set of transitions {t 1 ; t 3 } is a step of z 2 , but {t 1 } cannot be a step of z 1 , whose possible steps are ∅; {t 2 } and {t 1 ; t 2 }. The structure of the LTS labels will permit, however, to distinguish between LTS transitions describing steps and LTS transitions describing proper substeps. Notice that we use structured LTS labels, carrying causal information, and transitions corresponding to substeps in order to make our deÿnition of the semantics compositional.
Before giving the LTS we introduce some notations. An event A (over S) is a subset of S ∪ S such that, for no signal a ∈ S, both a and a are in A. An event A expresses a constraint over signals in S, namely a signal a is required to be present if a ∈ A, whereas it is assumed to be absent if a ∈ A. Deÿnition 3. Given an event A and a set of signals B such that either B is the singleton {b}, for some b ∈ S, or B is the empty set, the pair (A; B) is a causality pair with A acting as cause and B as e ect.
A causality pair (A; {b}) keeps track of the causal relation between the event A which triggers a statechart transition and a signal b which is broadcast when that transition ÿres. So, a set {(A; {b 1 }); : : : ; (A; {b n })} of causality pairs describes the ÿring of a transition labeled A={b 1 ; : : : ; b n }, and {(A; ∅)} describes the ÿring of a transition labeled A=∅.
A set of causality pairs E is complete (w.r.to transitivity) if, for any couple of causality pairs (A; B); (A ; B ) ∈ E such that B = {b} and b ∈ A , then ((A \{b}) ∪ A; B ) ∈ E. We denote with E + the least complete set of causality pairs containing E. (The set E + is the transitive closure of the causality relation described by E.)
• E l is a complete set of causality pairs such that (A; B)∈E l A ∪ B is an event;
The product of two LTS labels l 1 = E l1 ; Y l1 ; Z l1 and l 2 = E l2 ; Y l2 ; Z l2 , denoted by l 1 ⊗ l 2 , is the tuple
The set of all LTS labels is denoted by L.
Let p n and p n be two statechart terms and let p n l → p n be the LTS transition representing a substep T leading from p n to p n (p n T → p n ). The component E l describes the causality relation between events triggering statechart transitions in T and signals broadcast by these transitions. The requirement that (A; B)∈E l A ∪ B is an event corresponds to imposing signal consistency.
The components Y l and Z l say why the statechart transitions in Rel(p n )\T that are consistent with those in T have not been performed. In particular, the component Y l contains a signal b if there is a statechart transition t in Rel(p n )\T communicating b. Avoiding the performance of t permits to compose the substep p n T → p n with a (sub)step of a component running in parallel with p n and requiring b for triggering one of its transitions, which is not compatible with t. The constraint Y l ∩ (A; B)∈E l A ∪ B = ∅ means that the signals whose production is avoided are, coherently, neither in the trigger nor in the action of the transitions in T .
The set Z l contains a (resp.: a) if a transition belonging to Rel(p n )\T is not triggered because a is supposed to be non-communicated (resp.: communicated). The constraint Z l ∩ (A; B)∈E l A ∪ B = ∅ means that the signals that are assumed to be absent are, coherently, neither in the trigger nor in the action of the transitions in T , and that the signals that are assumed to be present do not appear as negated in the trigger of the transitions in T . Finally, we require Z l ∩ Y l = ∅ in order to ensure that the signals whose production is avoided are, coherently, not communicated.
Following this idea, the LTS label representing the ÿring of a statechart transition triggered by A and communicating B is (bas) Vice versa, the set of LTS labels representing the fact that a relevant statechart transition t triggered by A and communicating B has not ÿred is
Moreover, the set of LTS labels representing the fact that the set of relevant statechart transitions T = {t 1 ; : : : ; t h }, with out(t i ) = n, for 16i6h, have not ÿred is
The LTS for the MPT-semantics is deÿned by the TSS in Table 1 . With abuse of notation, side conditions of transition rules have been represented as premises.
Rule bas states that a statechart consisting of a basic state performs the empty set of transitions. This step is represented by the label ∅; ∅; ∅ .
According to rule and, a substep of two components running in parallel is the union of a substep of one component and a substep of the other, provided that the product of their labels is a label.
Rule or 1 deals with the performance of an upper level statechart transition of a statechart or-term p n . The LTS transition represents the step consisting of a transition t = n i ; A; B; n j . This is a step (not a proper substep) since any other relevant statechart transition in trans(p n )\{t} is not consistent with t.
Rule or 2 deals with the performance of a non-empty substep internal to the active component (i.e.p ni ) of a statechart or-term p n . The side condition E l = ∅ ensures that the substep is non-empty. Note that we do not need to justify the non-ÿring of any upper level relevant transition in T , since the transitions in T are not consistent with the transitions in the considered (sub)step.
Finally, rule or 3 deals with the case where p n = [n : (p n1 ; : : : ; p n k );p ni ; T ] performs an empty substep as a consequence of the fact that the active componentp ni performs an empty substep (E l = ∅) and no upper level relevant statechart transition in T ÿres (l ∈ N (n i ; T )).
Example 5. In Fig. 4c we show the LTS for the statechart z 1 of Fig. 2 . In Fig. 4a and in b we show the LTS's for the subterms rooted in the states 3 and 6, respectively. We have labeled every LTS state with the names of the FSM states giving the corresponding statechart conÿguration.
Let us consider the conÿguration {1; 3; 4; 6; 7}. LTS transition with label l 12 represents the empty substep, justiÿed by the absence of both a and b. LTS transition with label l 13 represents the empty substep, justiÿed by the fact that b is absent, so that t 2 cannot ÿre, and b cannot be broadcast, so that t 1 cannot ÿre. LTS transition with label l 14 represents the empty substep, justiÿed by the fact that neither b nor c can be broadcast. LTS transition with label l 15 represents the empty substep, justiÿed by the fact that a is absent, so that t 1 cannot ÿre, and c cannot be broadcast, so that t 2 cannot ÿre. LTS transition with label l 9 represents the step {t 1 ; t 2 }. LTS transition with label l 7 represents the step {t 2 } (t 1 does not ÿre because a is absent). Finally, LTS transition with label l 8 represents the proper substep {t 1 } (t 2 does not ÿre to avoid broadcasting of c). Consider now the statechart z 2 of Fig. 2 obtained by adding another component to z 1 . In the corresponding LTS there will be an LTS transition representing the step {t 1 ; t 3 } obtained by completing the substep {t 1 }. The compositional construction of {t 1 ; t 3 } could not be done if we would not consider the LTS transition with label l 8 .
We stress that components Y l and Z l in LTS labels are needed to represent correctly statechart behaviors. For instance, let us consider label l 8 . The fact that c ∈ Y l8 does not permit to compose l 8 with any LTS label representing a step T with a transition t ∈ T such that c ∈ tr(t) ∪ act(t). This is correct, since T ∪ {t 1 } cannot be a substep of any step. In fact, any step containing T ∪ {t 1 } contains also t 2 . Let us consider now the transition with label l 7 . The fact that a ∈ Z l7 means that the transition cannot represent a reaction to an environment broadcasting a.
Remark 6. The transition rules of Table 1 satisfy the syntactic restrictions imposed by the well known positive GSOS format [5] . We recall that a transition rule is in positive GSOS format if it has the form
where ar(f) is the arity of the function f, m i ¿0 and the variables x i and y hk are all distinct and are the only variables occurring in .
The PS-semantics
In this section we give two SOS compositional interpretations of the PS-semantics. The two interpretations di er only in the representation of non-reactivity phenomena. In the ÿrst interpretation, called Implicit PS-semantics (IPS-semantics), there is no explicit representation of a statechart term's inability to react to a given input. In the second interpretation considered, called Explicit PS-semantics (EPS-semantics), the inability of a term p n to react to a given input S is explicitly represented by marking the LTS state p n by a suitable predicate Q S . As in the case of the MPT-semantics, we use an LTS with structured labels carrying information on causality in order to make our deÿnition of the semantics compositional. In the following section we will be able to prove that our compositional deÿnition of both the IPS-semantics and the EPS-semantics correspond precisely to the (non-compositional) original deÿnition given in [22] .
The IPS-semantics
The IPS-semantics needs labels that are less structured than those of Deÿnition 4. An LTS label is now a pair l = E l ; Z l , deÿned as in Deÿnition 4 but forgetting the component Y l . We recall that Y l has been introduced in the MPT-semantics to keep track of transitions that are relevant and are not compatible either with those in the considered (sub)step, or with those of a (sub)step of a parallel component. The constraint of compatibility is not used in the deÿnition of step of the PS-semantics (see Eq. (2)) and then Y l can be dropped. All the operations concerning labels are redeÿned accordingly.
The TSS deÿning the IPS-semantics is given exactly by the transition rules of Table 1 , provided that the new notion of label is assumed.
The EPS-semantics
The interpretation of the EPS-semantics enforced also in [20] , explicitly represents the lack of a reaction, if this is the case, for a given input S. The LTS labels we use in this case have the same structure of the ones of the IPS-semantics. Before giving the TSS, we need to deÿne when a set of signals S triggers an LTS label l = E l ; Z l : ÿrst we deÿne what triggering means for sets of causality pairs and then we extend the notion to the entire LTS label structure.
Deÿnition 7.
A causality pair (A; B) is triggered by a set of signals S if all the signals which occur positive (resp.: negative) in A are (resp.: are not) in S, i.e. A ∩ S ⊆ S (resp.:
A set of causality pairs E is triggered by a set of signals S if there exists a subset E of E such that: (1) S triggers the causality pairs in E ; (2) S ∪ (A; B)∈E B triggers the causality pairs in E.
Intuitively, E ⊆ E represents a set of causality pairs which, being triggered, permit triggering of all the other causality pairs in E. In the following section, we shall prove that there exists a tight connection between the notion of triggering of sets of causality pairs and that of enabling and inseparability of sets of statechart transitions.
We extend now to LTS labels the notion of triggering by a set of signals. Intuitively, a set of signals S triggers a label l if l represents a step caused by S. In particular, S triggers a label l = E l ; Z l if S triggers its set of causality pairs E l , S does not contain signals in Z l , which are assumed to be absent, and S contains all signals in Z l that are assumed to be present and are neither in the trigger nor in the action of the ÿred statechart transitions.
Deÿnition 8.
A set of signals S triggers an LTS label l = E l ; Z l if the following conditions are satisÿed: (1) S triggers E l ; (2) S ∩ Z l = ∅ and a ∈ S for every a ∈ Z l such that a = ∈ (A; B) ∈ E l A ∪ B.
The TSS for the EPS-semantics is obtained from that for the IPS-semantics by adding a transition rule for labeling states with predicates. Such a rule is {p n l 9 | S triggers l} p n Q S :
The transition rule above permits to mark p n by Q S if p n does not perform any step caused by S, namely if p n cannot react to S. Since the predicate Q S does not appear in any premise of the transition rules for the EPS-semantics, it is easy to check that the given TSS is stratiÿable.
Proposition 9. The TSS for the EPS-semantics is stratiÿable.
Remark 10. The transition rules for the EPS-semantics satisfy the syntactic restrictions imposed by the well known panth format [28] , which allows the use of predicates and negative premises, and which is then more expressive than the positive GSOS format we have used up to now. We recall that a transition rule is in panth format if it satisÿes the following requirements:
• for each positive premise t l → t of , t is a single variable;
• the source of contains no more than one function symbol;
• the variables that occur as right-hand sides of positive premises or in the source of are all distinct.
Notice that we could also represent lack of reactivity without introducing predicates, by means only of properly labeled self loops. In this case a (non-positive) GSOS format would be su ciently expressive for our purpose. We prefer to use transitions only for (sub)steps.
Correspondence between SOS and step semantics
In this section we show that the LTSs deÿned in the previous section carry su cient information to express the step-semantics deÿned in [18, 22, 20] . In particular, we will put into correspondence the sets of statechart transitions which constitute steps for a term p n , given a set of signals S, with suitable LTS transitions departing from the node p n of the LTS.
We start with considering the LTS deÿned in Table 1 and the step semantics of [18] .
The following lemma shows the tight connection between the notion of triggering of sets of causality pairs and that of enabling and inseparability of sets of statechart transitions.
Lemma 11. For a term p n , let T = {t 1 ; : : : ; t m } ⊆ Rel(p n ) be a set of pairwise consistent and compatible transitions and let E(t i ), for 16i6m, be the set of causality pairs deÿned as follows:
For any set of signals S the following facts are equivalent:
• T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) and T is inseparable for S;
Proof. The proof is by induction on m¿1. See Appendix B.
Before establishing the correspondence between steps and LTS transitions, we present two preliminary results. We prove ÿrst that any LTS transition p n l →p n corresponds to a (sub)step p n T →p n .
Lemma 12.
Given an LTS transition p n l →p n there exists a set of transitions T ⊆ trans(p n ) such that: (1) p n T →p n and E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + ; (2) T ⊆ Rel(p n ) ∩ Cons(p n ; T ) ∩ Comp(p n ; T ); (3) tr(t) ∩ tr(t ) = ∅ for any pair of transitions t; t ∈ T ; (4) for each transition t ∈(Rel(p n ) ∩ Cons(p n ; T ))\T it holds that either tr(t)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of p n . See Appendix B.
In order to prove the opposite implication of Lemma 12, we adapt the notion of label triggering, given in the previous section (Deÿnition 8), to the structure of the LTS labels for the MPT-semantics. We require, in addition, that S does not contain any signal in Y l , whose production must be avoided.
Deÿnition 13.
A set of signals S triggers an LTS label l = E l ; Y l ; Z l if the following conditions are satisÿed:
Assume now any (sub)step T such that p n T →p n and a set of signals S containing t∈T (tr(t) ∩ S) ∪ act(t). We prove that, if no transition t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T is such that act(t) ⊆ S, so that there are steps containing T but not En(p n ; S; T )\T , then p n T →p n corresponds to an LTS transition p n l →p n with l triggered by S. Lemma 14. Given a set of transitions T ⊆ trans(p n ) and a set of signals S ⊇ t∈T (tr (t) ∩ S) ∪ act(t) such that: (1) T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ); (2) p n T →p n ; (3) for each transition t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T it holds that act(t)*S, there exists an LTS transition p n l →p n such that: (1) E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + ; (2) S triggers l; (3) for each transition t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T , it holds that act(t) ∩ Y l = ∅; (4) for each signal a ∈Y l such that a = ∈ (A; B)∈E l A, there is a transition t∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T such that a∈act(t).
We give now a criterion on LTS labels which permits to discriminate the LTS transitions representing steps from those representing proper substeps.
We say that a label l = E l ; Y l ; Z l is a step label if, for each b ∈ Y l , there exists some (A; B) ∈ E l such that b ∈ A. Intuitively, l represents a complete step if, for any transition t that is not performed to avoid communication of signals, there are transitions in the step requiring the absence of these signals.
As an example, let us consider the term p 7 representing the statechart z 1 of Fig. 2 in conÿguration {1; 3; 4; 6; 7} and the set of signals S = {a}. We have that Steps(p 7 ; S) = {{t 1 ; t 2 }}. Now, if we consider the LTS in Fig. 4c , S triggers both the labels l 8 and l 9 . While l 9 is a step label since Y l9 = ∅ (it is associated with the step {t 1 ; t 2 }), l 8 is not a step label since Y l8 = {c} and c ∈ (A; B)∈E l 8 A (actually, l 8 is associated with the incomplete substep {t 1 }).
We prove now the correspondence between steps and LTS transitions.
Theorem 15. For a term p n , let T ⊆ Rel(p n ) be a set of pairwise consistent and compatible transitions. For any set of signals S the following facts are equivalent:
(1) T ∈ Steps(p n ; S) and p n T →p n ;
(2) there is an LTS transition p n l →p n such that E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + ; l is a step label and S triggers l.
Proof. Let us assume that T ∈ Steps(p n ; S) and p n T →p n . Let S be the set of signals S = S ∪ t∈T (tr(t) ∩ S) ∪ act(t). Since T ∈ Steps(p n ; S), it holds that T ∈ Steps(p n ; S ). Now, T and S satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 14, and En(p n ; S ; T ) = T . By Lemma 14 there is an LTS transition p n l →p n such that E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + ; S triggers l and Y l ⊆ (A; B)∈E l A ∩ S (since En(p n ; S ; T )\T = ∅). The last fact implies that l is a step label. It remains to prove that S triggers l. Since T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) and T is inseparable for S, by Lemma 11 it follows that S triggers t∈T (E(t)) + = E l . Moreover, since S triggers l, S does not contain signals in Y l ∪ Z l , which implies that S does not contain signals in Y l ∪ Z l . Finally, given a signal a ∈ Z l , since S triggers l, either a ∈ (A; B)∈E l A ∪ B or a ∈ S , i.e. a is surely in S , which implies that either a ∈ (A; B)∈E l A ∪ B or a ∈ S. From these properties it follows that S triggers l.
Conversely, assume now that there is an LTS transition p n l →p n such that E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + ; l is a step label and S triggers l. By Lemma 12 there exists a set of transitions T ⊆ trans(p n ) such that: (1) p n T →p n and E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + ; (2) T ⊆ Rel(p n ) ∩ Cons(p n ; T ) ∩ Comp(p n ; T ); (3) tr(t) ∩ tr(t ) = ∅ for any pair of transitions t; t ∈ T ; (4) for each transition t ∈ (Rel(p n ) ∩ Cons(p n ; T ))\T it holds that either tr(t) ∩ Z l = ∅ or act(t) ∩ Y l = ∅. Since S triggers l, S triggers also the set of causality pairs E l . This implies, by Lemma 11, that T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) and T is inseparable for S. So, to prove the thesis it remains to prove that En(p n ; S; T ) = T . We proceed by contradiction assuming that there is t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T . In this case t ∈ (Rel(p n ) ∩ Cons(p n ; T ) ∩ Comp(p n ; T ))\T and, by point 4 of Lemma 12, either act(t) ∩ Y l = ∅ or tr(t) ∩ Z l = ∅. In the former case, for each signal a ∈ act(t) ∩ Y l , since l is a step label there is a transition t ∈ T s.t. a ∈ tr(t ) (as a consequence of E l = t∈T E(t)). This fact would lead to a contradiction since it would imply that t ∈Comp(p n ; T ). In the latter case, for each signal a ∈ tr(t) ∩ Z l it holds that a ∈ S (since S triggers l) and a ∈ t∈T tr(t) ∪ act(t) (by deÿnition of label), which implies that t ∈ Tr(p n ; S ∪ t∈T act(t)), thus leading to a contradiction since it would imply that t ∈ En(p n ; S; T ). Moreover, for each signal a s.t. a ∈ tr(t) ∩ Z l it holds that either a ∈ t∈T tr(t) ∪ act(t) or a ∈ S (since S triggers l) and, therefore, t ∈ Tr(p n ; S ∪ t∈T act(t)), thus leading to a contradiction since it would imply that t ∈ En(p n ; S; T ).
As far as the two LTS interpretations of Pnueli and Shalev's step semantics are concerned, analogous correspondence results can be stated.
Theorem 16. For a term p n , let T ⊆ Rel(p n ) be a set of pairwise consistent transitions. The following facts are equivalent (both in the IPS-semantics and in the EPS-semantics):
(1) T ∈Steps PS (p n ; S) and p n T → p n ; (2) there is an LTS transition p n l → p n such that E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + and S triggers l.
Proof. On the line of the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 16 implies the following result:
Corollary 17. For a term p n and a set of signals S the following facts are equivalent:
• Steps PS (p n ; S) = ∅;
• p n l 9 for any l triggered by S, in the EPS and IPS-semantics; • p n Q S in the EPS-semantics;
• the set ∅ is a step from p n for S in the step semantics of [20] .
Preorders and equivalences
In this section we compare the three introduced SOS semantics w.r.to a hierarchy of well known behavioral preorder and equivalence notions. The preorders we consider are ready simulation, simulation, ready trace preorder, failure preorder and trace preorder. We will show that all of these preorders are precongruences for both the MPT-semantics and the IPS-semantics. We will show also that only the ready simulation and the ready trace preorder are precongruences for the EPS-semantics. Moreover, we shall see that, in the case of the IPS-semantics, both the failure equivalence and the trace equivalence (namely the kernels of the failure preorder and the trace preorder, respectively) do not permit to distinguish terms that behave di erently w.r.to reactivity. The situation is depicted in Table 2 , where Y (resp.: N) means that the preorder is (resp.: is not) a precongruence, and Y * that the preorder is a precongruence but does not distinguish terms that behave di erently w.r.to reactivity.
The section is structured as follows. The ÿrst subsection recalls the above mentioned notions of behavioral preorder and equivalence. The second subsection contains the results summarized in Table 2 . Table 2 Precongruence results
. Two LTS's.
Preorder notions and precongruence formats
• is a ready simulation if it is a simulation and, for s 1 R s 2 :
• is a ready trace preorder if, for s 1 R s 2 , any ready trace of s 1 is a ready trace of s 2 (a sequence Example 19. Let us consider the two LTS's depicted in Fig. 5 and assume that P = ∅ (i.e. we are not taking account of predicates). It is easy to check that the relations R 1 = {(s 1 ; s 1 )} and R 2 = {(s 1 ; s 1 )} are trace preorders. If we consider the failure preorder we have that R 2 is a failure preorder while R 1 is not. In fact, for instance, (a; {c}) is a failure for state s 1 whereas it is not a failure for state s 1 . If we consider now the ready trace preorder we have that neither R 1 nor R 2 is a ready trace preorder. In fact, {a}; a; {b} is a ready trace of s 1 but it is not a ready trace of s 1 . Viceversa, {a}; a; {b; c} is a ready trace of s 1 but not of s 1 . As far as the simulation is concerned, we have that All the above relations are preorders (i.e. re exive and transitive relations). We write s 1 RS s 2 (resp.: s 1 S s 2 ) if there is a ready simulation (resp.: simulation) R such that s 1 R s 2 . The kernel of both these relations is called bisimulation and is denoted by ≈. We denote by RT (resp.: F ; T ) the ready trace preorder (resp.: failure preorder, trace preorder) and by ≈ RT (resp.: ≈ F ; ≈ T ) its kernel. It is well known that the preorders of Deÿnition 18 are structured by the hierarchy of inclusions shown in Fig. 6 (where → stays for ⊆) .
Equipping statechart terms with a SOS permits to establish results induced by the formats of the transition rules. A central issue in the area of SOS has been to deÿne rule formats ensuring that a behavioral equivalence (resp.: preorder) is a congruence (resp.: precongruence), meaning that each operator of the language respects this equivalence (resp.: preorder). In particular, the positive GSOS format used for both the MPT and the IPS-semantics ensures that both simulation and ready simulation are precongruences (see [7] ). The less restrictive format panth we have used for the EPS-semantics does not imply directly any useful property. Fortunately, some properties can be derived from restrictions of the general format panth which are fulÿlled by the transition rules of the EPS-semantics. We introduce now such restrictions.
Deÿnition 20. The variable dependency graph of the premises of a rule H= is a directed graph, with as vertices the set of variables, and as edges the set:
{(x; y) | there is a t l → t in H such that x occurs in t and y in t }:
A rule is in ready simulation format if the variables at the right-hand sides of its positive premises do not occur in the left-hand sides of its premises. A rule is in ready trace format if it is in ready simulation format and each pair of variables that occur at distinct positions in the target of are not connected in the symmetric closure of the variable dependency graph of the premises of .
The properties ensured by the formats introduced above are the following:
• If a TSS is in ready simulation format then the ready simulation preorder that it induces is a precongruence (see [7] ).
• If a TSS is in ready trace format then the ready trace preorder that it induces is a precongruence (see [1] ). Another useful format is the failure format introduced in [4] . Before introducing such a format, we need some auxiliary deÿnitions.
A panth transition rule is in ntytt format if it does not contain any predicate and the variables occurring as right-hand sides of positive premises are all distinct. Note that all transition rules in Table 1 are in ntytt format.
An occurrence of a variable in a ntytt transition rule is: • propagated if it is either in the target of or in the left-hand side of a positive premise whose right-hand side occurs in the target; • polled if it is in the left-hand side of a premise that does not have the right-hand side occurring in the target. As an example, all variables occurring in transition rules and, or 2 and or 3 in Table 1 are propagated. All variables occurring in transition rule or 1 exceptp ni are propagated. No variable occurring in transition rules and, or 1, or 2 and or 3 is polled. Now, given a predicate on the set {(f; i) | f ∈ and 16i6ar(f)}, we say that argument i of function f is either liquid, if ((f; i)), or frozen, otherwise.
An occurrence of a variable x in a term t ∈ T( ) is -liquid if either t = x or t = f(t 1 ; : : : ; t ar(f) ) and x is -liquid in t i , for some liquid argument i of f.
Finally, a variable in a ntytt rule is -oating if either it occurs as the right-hand side of a positive premise, or it occurs exactly once in the source, at a -liquid position.
Deÿnition 21. Let be a predicate on arguments of functions. A ntytt transition rule is -failure safe if: • it is in ready simulation format;
• each -oating variable is propagated at most once and at a -liquid position;
• each -oating variable is not both propagated and polled;
• each -oating variable is polled at most once, and at a -liquid position in a positive premise. Moreover, is in failure format if it is -failure safe for some , and its source is a variable or contains exactly one function symbol and no multiple occurrences of variables.
In [4] it is proved that if a TSS is in failure format, then the failure preorder that it induces is a precongruence.
As an example, the TSS of Table 1 is in failure format. In fact, if we take such that all arguments of functions are -liquid, it is easy to check that all transition rules are -failure safe, as a consequence of the fact that they are in ready simulation format, no variable is propagated more than once and no variable is polled. Moreover, the source of transition rule bas is a variable, and the sources of the other transition rules contain exactly one function symbol and no multiple occurrences of variables.
Precongruence results
Theorem 22. Simulation, ready simulation, ready trace preorder and failure preorder are precongruences for both the MPT and the IPS-semantics. Ready simulation and ready trace preorder are precongruences for the EPS semantics.
Proof. Since the MPT and the IPS-semantics fulÿll the restrictions of the positive GSOS format, both simulation and ready simulation are precongruences. The ready trace preorder is also a precongruence since the two semantics fulÿll also the restrictions of the ready trace format. The failure preorder is also a precongruence since the two semantics fulÿll also the restrictions of the failure format.
As far as the EPS-semantics is concerned, since the given SOS fulÿlls the restrictions of the ready simulation and the ready trace format, both ready simulation and ready trace preorder are precongruences.
As regards the trace preorder, no precongruence result can be ensured, in general, by the considered formats. However, in the concrete case of the MPT and the IPSsemantics such a precongruence result can be stated. We show that p n T q n implies p m T q m . Notice that any trace of p m has the form 
→.
So, we have proved that the trace preorder is preserved by the operators of the statechart process algebra, which implies the thesis.
We conclude now the investigation of the EPS-semantics stating some negative results.
Theorem 24. Simulation is not a precongruence for the EPS-semantics.
Proof. Let us assume the statechart terms p 3 ; p 7 and p 14 representing the initial conÿgurations of the statecharts depicted in Fig. 7 Proof. Let us assume the statechart terms p 5 , p 11 and p 20 corresponding to the initial conÿgurations of the statecharts depicted in Fig. 8 . It holds that p 5 ≈ T p 11 and that [n :p 5 ; p 20 ] ≈ T [n :p 11 ; p 20 ], thus proving that the trace equivalence is not a congruence. The former relation is immediate. The latter relation holds since [n :p 11 ; p 20 ] can reach a term p n , representing the conÿguration containing states 7, 13 and 16, from which no reaction to the empty input is deÿned, and, on the contrary, [n :p 5 ; p 20 ] can reach only a term p n , representing the conÿguration containing states 2, 13 and 16, from which a reaction is deÿned for any input. In fact, state 5 can broadcast a, so that the transition labeled a=b can ÿre and that labeled b=a is no more triggered. As a consequence, p n Q ∅ and p n ¬Q ∅ , which implies that {(∅; ∅)}; ∅ Q ∅ is a trace of [n :p 11 ; p 20 ] and is not a trace of [n :p 5 ; p 20 ].
Let us assume the statechart terms p 6 , p 13 and p 22 corresponding to the initial conÿgurations of the statecharts depicted in Fig. 9 . It holds that p 6 ≈ F p 13 and that [n :p 6 ; p 22 ] ≈ F [n :p 13 ; p 22 ], thus proving that the failure equivalence is not a congruence. The former relation is immediate. To see that the latter relation holds, let us note that [n :p 13 ; p 22 ] can reach a term p n , representing the conÿguration containing states 12, 15 and 18, that can react to both inputs {a} and {b}. In fact, if the environment gives {a} (resp. {b}), then the statechart transition broadcasting b (resp. a) and having 12 as source state can ÿre, so that both a and b are in the environment and trigger the statechart transition labeled ab= having 21 as source state. Therefore, it holds that p n ¬ Q {a} and p n ¬ Q {b} and that ( {(∅; ∅)}; ∅ ; {Q {a} ; Q {b} }) is a failure of [n : (p 13 ; p 22 )]. On the contrary, no term representing any conÿguration reachable by a step from [n :p 6 ; p 22 ] can react to both {a} and {b} and, therefore, ( {(∅; ∅)}; ∅ ; {Q {a} ; Q {b} }) is not a failure of [n :p 6 ; p 22 ]. In fact, if the conÿguration containing 2 (resp. 4) is reached, and if the environment broadcasts b (resp. a), then a (resp. b) cannot be broadcast. As a consequence, the transition labeled ab= cannot ÿre and, since the state 21 cannot be left and the two transitions labeled c=d and d=c are relevant, no reaction is deÿned.
The following result justiÿes using EPS-semantics instead of IPS-semantics.
Theorem 26. The trace and failure equivalences for the IPS-semantics do not distinguish terms that behave di erently w.r.to reactivity.
Proof. Let us assume the statechart terms p 5 , p 11 and p 20 corresponding to the initial conÿgurations of the statecharts depicted in Fig. 8 The results proved in this section imply the following corollary.
Corollary 27. Bisimulation, ready trace equivalence, failure equivalence and trace equivalence are congruences for both the MPT and the IPS-semantics. Bisimulation and ready trace equivalence are congruences also for the EPS-semantics. Trace preorder and failure preorder are not precongruences for the EPS-semantics.
Histories and hierarchical priorities
In the previous sections we have seen that the MPT-semantics and the EPS-semantics require transition rule formats of di erent expressive power: for MPT the positive GSOS format is su cient, for EPS at least the general (non-positive) GSOS format is needed. We can show now that there is a variant of Statecharts which can be expressed by the well known de Simone transition rule format [24] , which is less expressive than positive GSOS and for which all the preorders we have deÿned in Section 6 turn out to be precongruences (see [27] ).
We recall that a transition rule is in de Simone format if
where I ⊆ {1; : : : ; ar(f)} and the variables x i and y j are all distinct and the only variables that occur in . Moreover, the target t does not contain variables x i , for i ∈ I , and has no multiple occurrence of variables. Note that all of the transition rules of Table 1 are in de Simone format but the rule or 1 since there is a duplication of p nj in the target of the rule (i.e. it corresponds to a duplication of a variable in the rule format).
Entrance by history
The variant of Statecharts expressible in de Simone format is the one in which the substate of an or-state is activated by history rather than by default [10] . That is, when an or-state is activated it does not activate its default substate but the substate which has been most recently left. If we assume activation by history we can simplify the structure of or-terms, which have now the form [n : (p n1 ; : : : ; p ni−1 ; p ni+1 ; : : : ; p n k ); p ni ; T ]:
The idea is that p ni represents the conÿguration of the active substate and that p n1 ; : : : ; p ni−1 ; p ni+1 ; : : : ; p n k keep track of the history conÿgurations of the other substates.
The semantics of this variant of Statecharts is given by the rules of Table 1 This shows that a more powerful formalism is required to model defaults than to model histories.
Since the TSS is in de Simone format and this format implies that all the preorders deÿned in Section 6 are precongruences, it holds that all of the preorders for the MPT-semantics with histories are precongruences.
Obviously, if the Statechart model employs both entering substates by default and by histories, a positive GSOS format for transition rules has to be used.
Priorities
Statecharts permit to express priority relations between transitions by exploiting negative signals in their trigger. Priorities can be also explicitly expressed by marking transitions with a level of priority [17] , and by exploiting the hierarchical structure of statecharts [6] .
Following [6] , a transition from a state has higher priority w.r.t. all transitions internal to that state. As an example, in Fig. 1 transition t 3 has higher priority w.r.t. transition t 1 . Now, we can easily model priority induced by the hierarchical structure. We must replace rules or 2 and or 3 in Table 1 by the rule: Intuitively, to perform a (possibly empty) step internal to state n i , we require that no transition having n i as source state can ÿre.
The rule above is in positive GSOS format and respects the requirements of both the ready trace format and the failure format, and so also for Statecharts with priorities the same congruence results obtained for the MPT-semantics can be proved.
Conclusions
In this paper we have deÿned and formally compared the step semantics for Statecharts proposed in [22, 18, 20] in the common framework of the formalism SOS. The semantics considered are shown to be expressed with di erent formats of SOS transition rules and to enjoy di erent precongruence properties. The step semantics of [18] requires SOS transitions rules in positive GSOS format, which guarantees that simulation and ready simulation are precongruences. Moreover, the transition rules fulÿll also the requirements of both the ready trace format and the failure format, which guarantee that both the ready trace preorder and the failure preorder are precongruences. The property of precongruence of trace preorder, which is not directly ensured by the format, has been proved explicitly. Also priorities induced by hierarchy, as proposed in [6] , are expressed by positive GSOS rules. If one considers entering states by history, rather than by default, the de Simone transition rule format is su cient. This format guarantees that all of the preorders mentioned above are precongruences.
The step semantics of [22, 20] require a more powerful formalism than positive GSOS. In fact, negative premises are needed to explicitly represent the inability of statecharts to react to a given input. Due to these negative premises, the properties of precongruence of simulation, trace preorder and failure preorder do not hold.
As we have recalled in the introduction, another semantics for Statecharts has been proposed which assumes that signals broadcast by transitions in a step can be sensed and reacted to only at the subsequent step [11] . This assumption implies that there is no instantaneous causality between events triggering transitions and signals broadcast by them. As a consequence, to give an LTS interpretation for this semantics, it would be su cient to consider LTS labels carrying information on the availability=unavailability of signals, and not on signal causality, and one easily expects that all preorders and equivalences are precongruences and congruences, respectively.
Appendix A. TSSs with negative premises
We recall how to associate LTSs with TSSs, both in the case where only positive premises are used, and in the case where negative premises are allowed.
First of all we recall that a substitution is a mapping : Var → T( ). A substitution extends to a mapping from terms to terms, i.e. (t) is the term obtained by replacing occurrences of variables x in term t by (x).
Given closed terms t and t , a label l and a predicate P, relations t l → t ; t l 9 ; tP and t ¬ P are called literals.
Let T be a TSS. A proof of a closed transition rule H= from T is a well-founded, upwardly branching tree whose nodes are labeled by literals, where the root is labeled by and, if K is the set of labels of the nodes directly above a node labeled by ÿ, then:
• either K = ∅ and ÿ ∈ H , • or K=ÿ is a closed substitution instance of a transition rule in T .
If a proof of H= from T exists, then H= is provable from T . A closed transition is provable from T if the closed transition rule H= with H = ∅ is provable from T . Now, the meaning of a TSS T consisting of transition rules with only positive premises is the LTS having as transitions the set of the transitions provable from T .
When negative premises are admitted in the transition rules of T , we adopt the method to assign meaning to T based on the technique of stratiÿcation [9] .
For an LTS L and a set of literals H , we say that
∈ L for all negative literals t a 9 in H and all closed terms t ; • tP = ∈ L for all negative literals t ¬ P in H . A mapping S from transitions to ordinal numbers is a stratiÿcation of a TSS T i for every transition rule H= in T and every closed substitution :
• for positive premises ÿ in H , S( (ÿ))6S( ( )); • for negative premises t a 9 and t ¬ P in H , S( (t) a → t )¡S( ( )) for all closed terms t and S( (t)P)¡S( ( )), respectively.
A TSS with a stratiÿcation is stratiÿable. Let T be a TSS with a stratiÿcation S. The stratum L k of transitions for an ordinal number k is deÿned (using ordinal induction) in such a way that ∈ L k i : S( ) = k and T proves a closed transition rule H= with m¡k L m |= H:
The LTS associated with a stratiÿable TSS is the union of its strata, i.e. k L k . This deÿnition is meaningful since the set k L k is independent of the chosen stratiÿcation. For any set of signals S the following facts are equivalent:
• S triggers (E(t 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + .
Proof. The proof is by induction on m¿1.
Case m = 1. Note that (E(t 1 )) + = E(t 1 ). If {t 1 } is inseparable for S then t 1 ∈ En(p n ; S; ∅) and, therefore, t 1 ∈ Tr(p n ; S). This implies that S triggers any causality pair in E(t 1 ).
Conversely, assume that S triggers E(t 1 ). It follows that t 1 ∈ Tr(p n ; S), thus proving that {t 1 } is inseparable for S and, since t 1 is relevant by the hypothesis, that {t 1 } ⊆ En(p n ; S; {t 1 }).
Case m¿1. Assume that T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) and T is inseparable for S. Since T is inseparable for S then there is some t i ∈ En(p n ; S; ∅). Assume, without loss of generality, that t i = t 1 . It holds that t 1 ∈ Tr(p n ; S), i.e. S triggers E(t 1 ). Now, let us consider the set of transitions T = T \{t 1 } and the set of signals S = S ∪ act(t 1 ). Since T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ), the signals in S ∪ t∈T act(t) trigger the transitions in T , and, as a consequence, we have that T ⊆ Tr(p n ; S ∪ t∈T act(t)). Moreover, since T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) it follows immediately that T ⊆ Rel(p n ), T ⊆ Comp(p n ; T ) and T ⊆ Cons(p n ; T ). So, we have that T ⊆ En(p n ; S ; T ). We can prove also that T is inseparable for S . In fact, given any T ⊂ T , the inseparability of T for S implies that there exists a transition t ∈ T \T s.t. t ∈ Tr(p n ; S ∪ t∈T act(t)). If t = t 1 then En(p n ; S; T ) ∩ (T \T ) = ∅, and, as a consequence, En(p n ; S ; T ) ∩ (T \T ) = ∅. If t = t 1 then the inseparability of T for S implies that there exists a transition t ∈ T \(T ∪ {t 1 }) s.t. t ∈ Tr(p n ; S ∪ t∈T ∪{t1} act(t)) = Tr(p n ; S ∪ t∈T act(t)) and so, also in this case, En(p n ; S ; T ) ∩ (T \T ) = ∅, thus proving that T is inseparable for S . By the inductive hypothesis, if T ⊆ En(p n ; S ; T ) and T is inseparable for S then S triggers (E(t 2 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + . Let E be the subset of (E(t 2 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + of the causality pairs that are triggered by S . We have already proved that S triggers E(t 1 ). So, S triggers also the set E of the causality pairs {(A ; B) | (A; B) ∈ E and A = A\act(t 1 ) ∪ tr(t 1 )}. Note that E ⊆ (E(t 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + and that the union of all positive signals appearing in E and E(t 1 ) give the set of all positive signals appearing in the left side of the causality pairs of (E(t 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + . It follows that S triggers (E(t 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + . Assume that S triggers E m = (E(t 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + and let E be the subset of E m such that any element of E is triggered by S. We note that E must contain a set E(t i ) for some t i (in fact, by construction of E m , every (A; B) ∈ E m is such that A ⊇ A for some (A ; B ) ∈ E(t i ) and 16i6m). Without loss of generality, assume that t i = t 1 . Let us denote with T the set T \{t 1 } and with S the set S ∪ act(t 1 ). It holds that t 1 ∈ Tr(p n ; S). Since S triggers E m , each pair (A; B) ∈ (E(t 2 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m ))
+ ∩ E is triggered by S and, since t 1 ; : : : ; t m are pairwise compatible, by S . Moreover, each pair (A; B) ∈ (E(t 2 ) ∪ · · · ∪ E(t m )) + \E is triggered by S ∪ (A ; {b }) ∈ E {b } and, therefore, by S ∪ (A ; {b })∈E∩(E(t2)∪···∪E(tm)) + {b }. It follows that S triggers (E(t 2 ) ∪ · · · ∪points 1-4 of the thesis hold. Let us take T = T i . Points 1; 2 and 3 of the thesis hold trivially. Point 4 of the inductive hypothesis and the fact that no upper level transition in T is consistent with those in T i imply point 4 of the thesis. Let us consider the case where p n = p n is obtained by applying rule or 3 of Table 1 .
Then E l = ∅ and l = l i ⊗ l , wherep ni li →p ni ; E li = ∅ and l ∈ N (n i ; T ). Let us take T = ∅. Points 1; 2 and 3 of the thesis hold trivially. By the inductive hypothesiŝ Lemma 30 (See Lemma 14) . Given a set of transitions T ⊆ trans(p n ) and a set of signals S ⊇ t∈T (tr(t) ∩ S) ∪ act(t) such that: (1) T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ); (2) p n T → p n ; (3) for each transition t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T it holds that act(t) * S, there exists an LTS transition p n l → p n such that: (1) E l = ( t∈T E(t)) + ; (2) S triggers l; (3) for each transition t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T , it holds that act(t) ∩ Y l = ∅; (4) for each signal a ∈ Y l such that a = ∈ (A; B)∈E l A, there is a transition t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T such that a ∈ act(t).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of p n .
Case p n = [n]. We have that T = ∅; p n = [n] and En(p n ; S; T )\T = ∅. The LTS transi-
tion [n]
∅;∅;∅ → [n] obtained by applying the rule bas in Table 1 satisÿes the requirements of the thesis.
Case p n = [n :p n1 ; p n2 ]. Consider the two sets of transitions T 1 = T ∩ trans(p n1 ) and T 2 = T ∩ trans(p n2 ). Since S ⊇ t∈T (tr(t) ∩ S) ∪ act(t) and T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ), it holds that T i ⊆ En(p ni ; S; T i ). It is immediate that there are terms p n1 and p n2 s.t. p ni Ti → p ni and p n = [n :p n1 ; p n2 ]. Moreover, for each transition t ∈ En(p ni ; S; T i )\T i it holds that act(t) * S. In fact, if act(t) ⊆ S, since tr(t) ∩ S = ∅ for any t ∈ T , one would have that t ∈ En(p n ; S; T )\T , and act(t) ⊆ S, contrarily to the hypothesis. So, we can apply the inductive hypothesis to p n1 and p n2 , which implies that there are two LTStransitions p n1 l1 → p n1 and p n2 l2 → p n2 fulÿlling the requirements of the thesis. We prove that p n l1⊗l2 → [n :p n1 ; p n2 ] is the LTS transition we are looking for. We prove ÿrst that l 1 ⊗ l 2 is deÿned. Since T ⊆ En(p n ; S; T ) we have that 
